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Abstract 
Quantum entanglement has long been thought to be have deep metaphysical consequences.            
For example, it has been claimed to show that Humean supervenience is false or to involve a                 
novel form of ontological holism. One way to avoid confronting the metaphysical consequences             
is to adopt some form of antirealism. In this paper we discuss two prominent strands in recent                 
literature—wavefunction realism and “Super-Humeanism”—that appear quite different, but, as         
we see it, are instances of a more general strategy. In effect, what these attempt to do is to                   
diffuse the puzzle of entanglement by eliminating it. These interpretative movements are            
advertised as equally realist, but, we claim, fail to take an appropriately realist attitude towards               
entanglement. What we advocate instead is a genuine metaphysics of entanglement: instead of             
eliminating entanglement, develop a metaphysics that accounts for and explains it. 
 
1 Introduction 
Anyone who accepts quantum theory must allow that entanglement exists, in some sense. But              
it’s important to distinguish several related claims: 
 
1. Non-locality​: The existence of certain non-local phenomena, such as measurement          
results in an EPR experiment. 
2. Non-separability: ​The existence of composite systems assigned quantum states that          
cannot be recovered from the quantum states of the constituents of the system. 
3. Entanglement realism: ​The existence of some entity or entities in our fundamental            
ontology constitutive of entanglement.  
 
The first two theses are relatively uncontroversial, but as we’ll see, the lattermost is a point of                 
contention among interpreters of quantum theory. Our focus here will be with (3), but let’s briefly                
consider (1) and (2) before setting them aside. 
 
1.1 Non-locality 
Quantum theory predicts correlations in measurement outcomes incapable of locally causal           
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explanation. This follows from Bell’s theorem, which shows that any locally causal theory must              
conform to Bell’s inequality, which is violated by the predictions of quantum theory. After the               
experiments of Aspect in 1982 and those following him, we may now say that “[v]iolations of                
Bell’s inequality show that the ​world​ is nonlocal” (Maudlin 2011, p.111, original emphasis). 
 
Non-locality, then, is hard to deny. It’s an observable fact about our world that such correlations                
exist. Even those views that deny the reality or fundamentality of measurement outcomes must              
accept non-locality in some form at some level of description. On the Everett interpretation, for               
instance, the experience of an agent will almost certainly include evidence of non-local             
correlations in measurement outcomes. Non-locality is part of our evidence for quantum theory,             
and hence, it must be recovered by any interpretation lest it be empirically incoherent (Barrett               
1999).  4
 
1.2 Non-separability 
The term “non-separable” is sometimes taken to have metaphysical implications. Our use here             
has no such implications. The claim is simply that the application of quantum theory involves               
assigning quantum states to composite systems that cannot be factored into quantum states of              
their constituents. It is a further claim---which some deny---that these states represent particular             
physical properties or entities. 
 
The standard example of non-separability is a two-particle system assigned a pure state ψ​12 ​that               
doesn’t factor into pure states of the individual particles: ψ​12 ​≠ ψ​1 ⊗ ψ​2 where ψ​12 ∈ H​12​, ψ​1 ∈                  
H​1​, ψ​2 ∈ H​2 and H​12 = H​1 ⊗ H​2​. One can also define non-separability for an arbitrary quantum                 
state in terms of density operators. Here the quantum state of the joint system, ρ​12​, is                
non-separable just in case it violates: ρ​12 = ∑​i​α​i​ρ​1​i ⊗ ρ​2​i​, with α​i > o, ∑​i​α​i = 1. Non-separability is a                    
widely accepted feature of the standard quantum formalism and its application. There are             
difficult questions about the correct formal structure for quantum theory in general, and how to               
4 Wallace (2012) claims that Bell’s theorem simply doesn’t apply to the Everett interpretation given the 
latter’s denial of unique measurement outcomes. And non-ontic view such as QBism and Healey’s 
pragmatism claim to be fully local. However, the point remains that when Alice and Bob compare 
measurement results from an EPR experiment they (almost certainly) find violations of Bell inequalities. 
One may deny the inference from these correlations in ​reports​ to correlations in ​reality​, but even so, there 
will remain an analog to non-locality in reports---once Alice finds out Bob’s measurement results, she 
finds violations of Bell inequalities. Denying the veridicality of such reports brings one perilously close to 
solipsism (Norsen 2016). 
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characterize non-separability in particular, but it remains a core feature of any quantum theory              
that some states will have this character. Indeed, in introducing entanglement, Schrödinger            
(1935) called non-separability “not one but rather ​the ​characteristic trait of quantum mechanics”             
(p.555, original emphasis). Thus, any view that accepts the quantum formalism in anything like              
its standard form will allow for the non-separability of quantum states. 
 
1.3 Entanglement realism 
Entanglement realism requires more than merely recognizing the existence of non-local           
phenomena and non-separable quantum states. In particular, it requires that non-separable           
states represent genuine entanglement in the world. The details of how entanglement is             
understood may vary, but the realist regards entanglement as part of the structure of our world                
rather than a mere appearance. Consider an analogy with retrograde motion, the apparent             
“backwards” motion of certain planets through the sky relative to the background of stars. On               
the Ptolemaic astronomical model, planets travel along circular orbits around the earth and             
smaller epicycles around a point on the main orbit. The combination of the motion along the                
epicycle and the main orbit allows a planet to travel backwards for brief periods of time, allowing                 
for their retrograde motion. On the Copernican model, however, planets travel along orbits             
around the sun and apparent retrograde motion occurs when a planet overtakes, or is overtaken               
by, the earth. Hence, retrograde motion is real on the Ptolemaic view, but merely apparent for                
the Copernican. It seems natural to say that the Ptolemaic position is ​realist about retrograde               
motion while the Copernican position is ​antirealist​. 
 
Analogously, the entanglement realist embraces entanglement as a genuine feature of reality            
that is not merely apparent. This licenses the metaphysics of entanglement, which seeks to              
understand the nature of this feature of our world. Although the term may not be in wide usage,                  
one can find several authors gesturing at entanglement realism. For instance, Wallace (2012),             
in describing entanglement on the Everett interpretation says that “picturesquely, we can think             
of entanglement between states as a string connecting those states, representing the nonlocal             
relation between them” (p.304). Healey (2012) rejects entanglement realism when he argues           
against the claim that “ascribing an entangled state to quantum systems is a way of               
representing some new, non-classical, physical relation between them” (p.31). And Esfeld           
(2004) suggests a version of entanglement realism when he claims that “[w]hatever            
entanglement may exactly be, it is a relation among quantum systems. ‘Being entangled with’ is               
3 
a property that is predicated of at least two quantum systems; it is thus a relational property”                 
(p.604). 
 
There are several ways of denying entanglement realism. Most straightforwardly, views that            
deny the quantum state a representational role do not find entanglement in the world. QBism,               
for instance, takes quantum states to encode an agent’s beliefs as they relate to certain               
experimental procedures and future experiences (Fuchs et al. 2014). Healey’s pragmatist view           
of quantum theory differs significantly from QBism, and gives quantum states a more objective              
status (Healey 2017). But, Healey agrees that the primary function of an entangled state is to               
tell an agent to expect Bell-type correlations when comparing the outcomes of certain             
experiments. On such views, entanglement, as a relation between quantum states, concerns a             
particular kind of belief an agent might have—one which would lead them to expect non-local               
phenomena.  5
 
Such non-representational views aren’t the only way to be an antirealist about entanglement. An              
interpretation may grant the quantum state a representational role, but still deny that entangled              
states describe worldly entanglement. Indeed, below we claim that two “realist” approaches to             
the metaphysics of quantum theory are committed to entanglement antirealism. On these views,             
quantum states do sometimes describe features of the world, but not in a manner that               
countenances entities, properties, or relations constitutive of entanglement. Wavefunction         
realism and Super-Humeanism (or “Bohumeanism”) are often motivated by a desire to avoid             
what are perceived as problematic metaphysical implications of entanglement, but we argue            
that these problems aren’t so great as to motivate eliminating entanglement in the manner they               
suggest. 
 
Before closing this introduction, it’s worth noting that, other things being equal, realism has              
certain benefits. First, it accords with a flat-footed understanding of the metaphysical            
implications of physics. While it’s clear that one cannot read-off metaphysics from physics, it is               
nevertheless an aim of naturalistic metaphysics to let physics guide much of our metaphysical              
theorizing. The realist attitude recommends taking theories at face-value and committing to the             
ontology they describe. Second, realism has certain explanatory power. The realist is able to              6
5 Or ​reports​ of apparently non-local phenomena. See footnote 1. 
6 Of course, it’s sometimes impossible to take a theory at face-value, and hence some amount of 
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provide explanations involving the nature of reality itself rather than merely being limited to the               
predictive features of our scientific theories. In the case of entanglement, this suggests that the               
realist will be able to offer explanations of non-local phenomena unavailable to the             
anti-realist---viz. those based in genuine physical entanglement.  7
 
2. Humeanism and entanglement 
 
One motivation for abandoning realism about entanglement is the perceived threat to the             
doctrine of Humean Supervenience, which lies at the heart of Lewis’s neo-Humean approach to              
metaphysics. Humean Supervenience, in Lewis (1986), says that everything supervenes on the           
monadic properties of point-like things plus spatiotemporal relations. But entanglement seems           
to show that there are things that don’t supervene on that basis, and hence, that Humean                
Supervenience is false. 
 
The response that we favor is that this problem for Humean Supervenience is nowhere near as                
serious as is often made out. This is because, for all that has been shown so far, it is perfectly                    
compatible with Humean Supervenience to simply include in the supervenience basis whatever            
troublesome relations are supposed to be required by entanglement. Obviously one cannot do             
that for every threat to Humean Supervenience, or the thesis would be trivial. But so long as the                  
relations to be added are not powers, or lawmaking relations between universals, or otherwise              
obviously unHumean, it seems that admitting, say, an “opposite-spin” relation into the ontology             
will do no harm at all—the natural thought would be that such relations can be analyzed as                 
“external” in Lewis’s sense. And, surely, the burden of proof is at least partly on the                
anti-Humeans to show that the relations in question cannot be thus analyzed—and nothing like              
that has been shown so far. Since the context of much of this discussion is in the movement                  
towards “naturalistic” metaphysics—the demand for metaphysicians to take notice of natural           
science—the proper response for Humeans is to accept the extra ontology and await a              
demonstration that it conflicts with their ideology. 
 
An alternative response, which we follow Esfeld and Deckert (2017) in calling           
(re-)interpretation is required. The point here is that realism requires an attitude or methodology of 
beginning from a flat-footed literal reading of a physical theory and going from there. 
7 We will return to explanatory power of entanglement realism in section 3 below. 
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“Super-Humeanism”—though as will become apparent it is not clear that there is anything super              
about it—is advocated in various forms by Esfeld and Deckert, Miller (2014) (under the heading               
“Bohumeanism”), and Bhogal and Perry (2017). Our claim in this section is that Humeans              
should reject Super-Humeanism and should take the more neutral stance, holding that whatever             
the fundamental ontology turns out to be, it will be analyzable in terms of some fundamental                
things standing in natural external relations.  
 
The reasons for this are best seen in light of the alleged advantages of Super-Humeanism; we                
will focus on two: 1. The claim that Super-Humeanism is somehow more faithful to the true                
nature of entanglement, and 2. The claim that it avoids quidditism. We’ll argue that both claims                
are problematic. 
 
2.1 Super-Humeanism and the nature of entanglement  
 
Under the heading of “Quiddistic Entanglement,” Bhogal and Perry consider something like the             
Humean response that we prefer. They say that a way out of the conflict between Humean                
Supervenience and QM: 
 
“...is to deny that entangled states imply anything about any other states. This view accepts that                
there is a world where two particles are in a Singlet state but yield matching outcomes to                 
properly calibrated x-spin measurements. This is an option for the Humean. It’s major drawback              
is that it involves a unintuitively quiddistic conception of entanglement—it violates the intuition             
that entanglement implies something substantive about the particles so entangled. Perhaps           
such a quidditism isn’t so bad for the Humean, after all if the Humean is to use recombination                  
she will require a quiddistic conception of the properties that make up the mosaic. But our view                 
does not have a quiddistic conception of entanglement; it retains a more intuitive understanding              
of the phenomena.” (Bhogal and Perry 2017, p.8) 
 
The option rejected here seems to us to be exactly the right one to consider: Humeans are                 
already committed to properties understood as quiddities, so why not have a few more? This               
parallels the preferred response above: Lewis is already committed to a class of natural external               
relations, so why not accept some more to account for entanglement. We accept, of course, that                
entangled states imply something about their substates; what we deny is that they imply              
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anything with metaphysical necessity. The intuition that entanglement implies something          
substantive about the particles so entangled is satisfied by their instantiating natural external             
relations beyond the spatiotemporal. Anything more involved than that is unHumean. 
 
The claim that entanglement “implies something substantive about the particles so entangled”            
may mean a number of things, of course. Take a view on which the entangled particles                
somehow cease to become numerically distinct, or are “non-individuals,’’ or something similar.            
This kind of view does indeed appear to imply something very substantive about the particles.               
Or suppose that one thought that the correspondence between the part-whole relation and a              
relation of ontological dependence somehow became inverted in entanglement: whereas          
usually the whole depends on the parts, now the parts depend on the whole; one can see how                  
entanglement would then imply something strikingly substantive about the particles. In a sense,             8
we want to say that the entanglement-as-external-relations view also implies something           
substantive about the entangled particles of our world—viz. that they instantiate a certain             
natural relation. On the other hand, there is nothing implied about the particles considered              
individually—indeed, that is the whole point.  
 
The Super-Humean view also, of course, implies nothing substantive about the particles            
considered individually—in some variants they are just featureless blobs. Nor is there anything             
even as substantive as the instantiation of a natural relation—the whole point of a Humean               
treatment is, of course, to make things ​un​substantive—Humeans being suspicious of           
substantive things like powers and necessary connections as being ultimately unintelligible. So,            9
in a sense, the Super-Humean view ​can’t imply anything substantive about entanglement,            
because Super-Humeanism doesn’t imply anything substantive about ​anything​. What the          
Super-Humean view does imply, and presumably the advantage that Bhogal and Perry have in              
mind, is that there is something about entangled particles that is ​necessarily true about              
entangled particles: necessarily, if ​x and ​y are entangled then ​p​, where ​p is a fact involving laws                  
and thus ultimately—on the best-system view of laws—about the whole mosaic. But what is              
unclear now is why ​Humeans​ should particularly value that.  
 
8 See section 3 below for a discussion of this approach to the metaphysics of entanglement. 
9 But again, the point of the entanglement-as-external-relations view is that Humeans already accept 
some natural relations, so why not a few more? 
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Maybe we should understand “substantive” as something like ​observable​. Bhogal and Perry            
need not mean ​actually observable, but perhaps ​reflected somehow or other in the pattern              
exhibited by the Humean mosaic​. And it does do this, of course: to be entangled ​is just a matter                   
of things being thus and so in the Humean mosaic. So obviously being entangled              
implies—strictly implies—something about the mosaic.   10
 
But, as Bhogal and Perry acknowledge, Humeans, especially those following Lewis, are ​already             
in the business of denying that many things hold of metaphysical necessity. In a different               
context, but illustrating perfectly the general attitude, it famously seems that on Lewis’s theory of               
transworld identity, Lewis should happily accept that he ​could have been a fried egg. Nothing               
particularly substantive, in this sense, is implied about ​anything​, and it is unclear why              
entanglement should be an exception.  
 
2.2 Humeanism and quidditism  
 
Esfeld and Deckert, and Bhogal and Perry, all suggest that avoiding quidditism is a desirable               
feature of the Super-Humean strategy over regular Humeanism. But is it really? 
 
The first question is what exactly is supposed to be wrong with quidditism anyway. Esfeld and                
Deckert (2017) say that Lewis’s quidditism is “occult” (p.46) and “baroque” (p.49). But it’s not              
like quidditism is an extra bit of ideology, like powers again, it’s just a thesis about the                 
distribution of stuff over the plurality or about the extent of the plurality. It’s hard to see what                  
exactly is “baroque” about that. The question of whether quidditism is occult raises an              
interesting parallel with what exactly Humeanism is supposed to be, and why we should try to                
defend it in the apparent conflict with quantum mechanics. 
 
One way of understanding Humeanism is available once one buys into the rest of the Lewisian                
ontology: Once we have laid out before us the whole of the Lewisian plurality of worlds, we                 
simply ask: is it the case that ​A and ​B are in one world, but in no world is there ​A but not ​B​? If ​A                          
and ​B qualify as “distinct existences”, then this would be a “necessary connection between              
10 It implies something either directly, in terms of the outcomes of measurements actually performed, or 
indirectly, in terms of the outcomes of measurements that are not, but could be, performed​—​such 
counterfactual outcomes also being a matter of the mosaic (everything supervenes on the mosaic, 
including counterfactuals). 
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distinct existences”: claims of necessary connection are just modal claims, and those are             
evaluated in the usual way. 
 
Quidditism, in the Lewisian idiom (e.g., modality is captured by bog-standard first order             
quantification), concerns what Esfeld and Deckert call indiscernible worlds. In some contexts,            
two worlds are indiscernible if they have exactly the same Humean mosaic—i.e., if the pattern of                
instantiation of fundamental properties and relations (and thus also the laws, since the laws are               
determined by the pattern of instantiation of fundamental properties and relations), are the             
same. In Esfeld and Deckert’s usage, two worlds are indiscernible if, so far as their inhabitants                
could tell, the pattern of instantiation of fundamental properties and relations (and thus also the               
laws), are the same. Since epistemic access to the fundamental properties and relations is via               
discovery of the laws, the inhabitants of such worlds (​w and ​w*​) cannot tell which of those two                  
worlds they are in. 
 
Just as haecceitism can be thought of as the metaphysical apparatus (“haecceity”, “primitive             
thisness”, etc.) that allows the circumstance that an individual may occupy some role in one               
world but not in another, even though it has the relevant properties in both, so quidditism can be                  
seen as the metaphysical apparatus that allows the circumstance above (viz. that there are              
worlds ​w and ​w* that are indiscernible in the second sense). But—especially in the case of                
haecceitism, the metaphysical apparatus in question is extremely murky, and so it is better to               
think directly about the circumstance in question—thus, we can simply ask whether or not there               
are haecceitistic differences—and the question of whether there are haecceitistic differences is            
simply a question about the way in which the Lewisian plurality is. In the case of quidditism, the                  
background metaphysics is not quite so murky—if universals are what make for natural             
properties then they seem to deliver quiddities easily enough—but again it is cleanest to talk               
simply in terms of quidditistic differences. So, our metaphysics is committed to quidditism if              
there are worlds like ​w​ and ​w*​ above. 
 
So, then, the question is just whether there are worlds like ​w and ​w*​, and given Lewis’s                 
recombination principle the answer seems to be obviously yes. So, quidditism follows. On this              
way of thinking, quidditism is just a claim about what worlds there are. It’s no more or less occult                   
than modal realism. 
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There is a different way of thinking about what Humeanism is: the rejection of “occult”               
metaphysics such as powers. In a similar way, one can think of quidditism not in terms of the                  
way the plurality is, but in terms of the way in which Lewis understands natural properties: are                 
there universals, for example, to correspond to natural properties? If so, then quidditism again              
easily follows, because properties just correspond to universals, so of course universal ​F can              
play the same role in one world as universal ​G plays in another—this just requires the right                 
pattern of instantiation of ​F and ​G​. But again, there is nothing “occult” about this—it’s just the                 
way of thinking about natural properties that is central to Lewis’s metaphysics, and is only occult                
if natural properties are (Lewis 2009, p.210). 
 
Esfeld and Deckert advertise the avoidance of quidditism as an advantage of            
Super-Humeanism because (a) quidditism, and quidditistic humility, are inessential features of           
true Humeanism, and, moreover, are undesirable features, and (b) their metaphysics avoids            
quidditism but is in other respects like Lewis’s Humeanism. But for the reasons above, (a) is                
unconvincing. As for (b), does the Super-Humean strategy really avoid quidditism? In a sense,              
of course, they have avoided quidditism for monadic properties by not having any monadic              
properties. But, they do still have relations—the fundamental distance relations—so why are            
they not still committed to quidditism about the relations? And if they are, then doesn’t this                
undermine the whole argument? Quidditism about relations is still quidditism! 
 
Now of course there may be reasons why entanglement relations must be different in kind from                
spatiotemporal relations, such that one could see spatiotemporal relations—but not          
entanglement—in a non-quidditistic way, but that has to be spelled out, and that has not been                
done. Moreover, it seems clear that we do have quidditism about the distance relations: 
In the discussion of quidditism, and consequent humility about the fundamental properties,            
Lewis (2009) proposes to “speak of ‘fundamental properties’ for short, but they fall into several               
categories. There are all-or-nothing monadic properties. There are all-or-nothing ​n​-adic          
relations, at least for smallish ​n​. There are properties that admit of degree” (p.205).              
Spatiotemporal relations appear to admit of degree, so cannot perhaps be thought of as all-or               
nothing; but what seems certain is that so far as quidditism and humility are concerned, what                
goes for monadic properties goes too for relations. Thus, in discussing the consequences of              
quidditism, Lewis takes for granted that humility extends to relations.  11
11 “Suppose we have a structural property: say, the property of being composed of an F bearing relation R 
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Thus, it seems clear that quidditism applies to relations just as much as to monadic properties.                
And so nothing is gained, from this point of view, by moving to an ontology that includes only                  
relations among the fundamental properties. Thus there is nothing super about           
“Super-Humeanism” over bog-standard Humean supervenience; apart, of course, from the fact           
that Super-Humeanism is apparently compatible with quantum mechanics whereas standard          
Humean superveience is not. But then, of course, the obvious move of acknowledging the              
lessons of entanglement rather than evading them, and making the appropriate additions to the              
supervenience basis, works just as well to achieve the required reconciliation. 
 
3. Holism and entanglement 
 
Another strand of entanglement antirealism is motivated by the suggestion that entanglement            
involves a kind of ontological holism. Some forms of holism clearly endorse entanglement             
realism. For instance, the relational holism of Teller (1986) maintains that entanglement is             
manifested in relations between entangled particles that fail to supervene on their intrinsic             
properties. Relational holism is closely-aligned with the approach we favor in the Humean             
context, and shares many of its virtues. However, other forms of holism have the effect of                12
eliminating entanglement from fundamental reality. In particular, ​wavefunction realism maintains          
that the fundamental ontology of physical reality is located in a high-dimensional space free              
from non-local influences and entanglement relations. 
 
“Wavefunction realism” is a misleading term. A number of views claim that the wavefunction (or               
quantum state) is real and reserve a place for it in their fundamental ontology. The version of                 
wavefunction realism we have in mind here, is the one defended in, e.g.,             
Albert (1996, 2013); Loewer (1996); Ney (2012, 2013, 2015); North (2013). On this view, the     
wavefunction is understood as a physical field defined on a high-dimensional space—in the             
case of ordinary non-relativistic quantum mechanics, a 3​n​-dimensional configuration space,          
to a G, where F, R, and G are fundamental. If we do not know the identities of the properties we have 
called ‘F’, ‘R’, and ‘G’ we also do not know the identity of the structural property constructed out of them” 
(Lewis 2009, p.215). 
12 Unlike the Humean approach discussed above, Teller maintains that spacetime is substance, and 
hence, that spatiotemporal relations ​do​ supervene on the intrinsic properties of their relata (i.e., are 
internal rather than external). Thus, he takes the relational holism implied by entanglement to be a novel 
feature of the quantum world. 
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where ​n ​is the number of particles that exist. Because the wavefunction is part of the most                 
fundamental description of the world, and is defined on configuration space, it is this              
3​n​-dimensional space rather than ordinary 3-dimensional space that is fundamental. Far from            
denying the reality of entanglement, defenders of wavefunction realism often point to            
entanglement and non-locality as sources of motivation. 
 
There are at least two arguments used to motivate wavefunction realism on the basis of               
entanglement. The first is formal in nature. It begins with the observation that one cannot               
adequately characterize an entangled system with wavefunctions defined on 3-dimensional          
space. One cannot distinguish an entangled pure state from a similar mixed state using only               
individual position wavefunctions in 3-space. “To capture the difference between [pure and            
mixed] states, we must use the additional spatial degrees of freedom we have in configuration               
space. Entanglement is a completely pervasive feature of a quantum world, and what is needed               
to capture states that are entanglements of position... is a configuration space representation”             
(Ney 2013, p.17). This point is correct as far as it goes, however, the fact that individual position                  
wavefunctions in 3-space are incapable of capturing entanglement needn’t recommend moving           
to configuration space. One may opt instead to (a) adopt a different understanding of the               
quantum state than one based on individual position wavefunctions (e.g., the spacetime state             
realism of Wallace and Timpson 2010) or (b) recognize more than individual position             
wavefunctions in one’s fundamental ontology (e.g., physical relations constitutive of          
entanglement). Thus, this motivation for moving to configuration space will only appeal to those              
who already accept a fundamental ontology free from entanglement. 
 
Another argument from entanglement to wavefunction realism is explanatory in nature. In light             
of Bell’s theorem, one cannot explain non-locality in familiar causal terms without invoking             
action at a distance. However, Ismael and Schaffer (2016) argue that a non-causal             13
explanation of non-locality can be given in terms of “common ground.” The core idea is that if                 
entangled particles are fundamentally non-distinct, then correlations in measurement outcomes          
involving them may be accounted for by appeal to grounding relations—properties of the             
individual particles are determined by properties of their common ground. There are a variety of               
13 We are taking “familiar causal terms” here to refer to either a direct causal connection or a common 
cause explanation capable of “screening-off” the correlata in the sense of Reichenbach (1971). 
Retrocausal explanations are also being set aside. 
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ways of developing a common ground account, some of which are eliminative and some of               
which aren’t. Our contention here is that the non-eliminative versions do a better job of               
explaining what’s special about entanglement. 
 
Wavefunction realism may be considered to be a version of the common ground approach. For               
the advocate of wavefunction realism, the manifestation of non-locality in 3-space is a reflection              
of a more fundamental state of affairs in 3​n​-space. In particular, the coordinated behavior of               
distinct particles in 3-space is explained by appeal to the fact that, fundamentally, they have a                
common ontological basis in the fundamental 3​n​-space. Moreover, the fundamental states of            
affairs involve no non-locality; happenings at one location in 3​n​-space are independent of             
happenings at “distant” locations. Thus, wavefunction realism seems to offer the prospect of a              14
satisfying ontic explanation of non-locality that avoids action at a distance, or fundamental             
entanglement in the world. 
 
The problem is that this implementation of the common ground strategy is global insofar as               
everything in 3-space has a common basis in the ontology of 3​n​-space. The particles involved in                
an EPR experiment are fundamentally non-distinct, for example, but so are any pair of particles               
anywhere in the world. Arguably, this results in a kind of (priority) monism, as defended by                
Schaffer (2010). But part of what is required in an explanation of non-locality is an account of                 
what is special about the systems that manifest it, and on monism, having a common ground is                 
a perfectly generic feature of everything found in 3-space. 
 
Schaffer (2010) argues that entanglement (“non-separability” in our terminology) is itself           
perfectly generic in quantum theory, and hence, that monism is well supported. This suggests              
that wavefunction realism may provide a satisfying common ground explanation after all.            
However, there are several issues with this reply. First, it’s not at all clear that “the cosmos                 
forms one vast entangled system” (​ibid.​, p.52). While it is true that some interpretations of               
quantum theory may recognize a universal wavefunction in which the entire universe is             
described by a massively-entangled quantum state, other interpretations reject either: (a) that            
there is a universal wavefunction or (b) that such a state would involve widespread              
14 Note that the “locality” of points in configuration space is only analogous to locality in ordinary space. 
The notion of “distance” involved is defined by a metric on 3​n​-space, analogous but not identical to the 
familiar notion of spatial distance. 
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entanglement. Second, even if there is an entangled universal wavefunction, there is a             
distinction to be drawn between subsystems that display non-local behavior and those that             
don’t. Careful preparation is required to display non-local phenomena capable of violating a Bell              
inequality, and the vast majority of observable phenomena do not display non-locality in this              
sense. Believers in an entangled universal wavefunction typically appeal to decoherence to            
establish the required distinction (e.g., Wallace 2012), but then it seems to be decoherence              
rather than common ground doing the explanatory work. In sum, an appeal to common ground               
cannot explain non-locality in the sense of saying what’s special about systems that display it if                
every physical system ​shares in that common ground.  
 
According to the wavefunction realist, the appearance of entanglement in 3-space is evidence             
that there is something wrong in our choice of fundamental space. They advocate moving to               
3​n​-space where problematic non-locality is no longer present. In moving to a higher-dimensional             
space, the wavefunction realist has eliminated entanglement rather than embraced it. The            
wavefunction realist advertises this as an explanation of entanglement, but it more resembles             
an error theory. It can explain why there ​appears to be entanglement, but in the end, it is only a                    
feature of the redundant representation of a reality free from entanglement (Ismael,            
forthcoming). Thus, for the wavefunction realist, entanglement is not a part of the fundamental              
structure of the world. 
 
Fortunately, one can take up the common ground strategy without eliminating entanglement.            
The key is to locate entanglement in the same space where we find non-locality, that is, ordinary                 
3-space. The relations of ontological dependence (or grounding) that link entangled physical            15
systems can obtain without invoking a more fundamental non-spatiotemporal level of reality. For             
example, consider a case of ordinary physical composition, say, hydrogen and oxygen atoms             
composing a water molecule. One may regard the composite systems—the water molecule—as            
dependent on (or grounded in) the atoms that compose it. As a result, features of the composite                 
may be explained by features of its constituent parts. For instance, the overall electrical              
neutrality of the (non-ionized, liquid state) water molecule may be explained by the respective              
charges of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms (ions). It is often supposed that ontic explanations               
15 Or, more accurately, 4-dimensional spacetime. We will continue to speak in terms of 3+1 dimensional 
space and time as this is the setting in which ordinary, non-relativistic quantum mechanics is often 
situated. That said, none of the arguments given depend on this being the fundamental space rather than 
relativistic spacetime. 
14 
require relations of dependence (causal or non-causal), so that there must be a real-world              
dependence relation underlying explanations like this one (Koslicki 2012, p.213; Schaffer 2017,            
pp. 308-9). In this case, the dependence relation is that of a whole on its parts. But, given that                   
ontological dependence and composition are distinct notions, it’s at least conceptually possible            
that parts could depend on wholes. 
 
Thus, one can maintain that entanglement involves cases of part-on-whole dependence. Two            
electrons in the spin singlet state depend on the two-electron whole they compose. This              
dependence relation, in turn, can support an ontic explanation of the anti-correlation of their              
spins described by quantum theory: the two-electron system has net spin = 0, hence, if one                
electron is spin +½ along a given axis, the other electron must be spin -½ along that axis. This                   
has the same structure as the ordinary case, only with the direction of part-whole dependence               
reversed. Unlike wavefunction realism, this version of the common ground story needn’t be             
global; part-on-whole dependence is a unique feature possessed by all and only entangled             
systems. Hence, the account recognizes entanglement in the form of characteristic relations of             
ontological dependence in ordinary 3-space. 
 
This style of explanation also admits of an alternative reading. It could be that part-on-whole               
dependence indicates we have individuated systems in too fine-grained a manner. For instance,             
if we try to treat a system as having parts that it lacks, then we should expect to find this                    
non-standard pattern of ontological dependence. Thus, when we attempt to ascribe quantum            
states to entangled particles—e.g., by taking the partial trace of the density operator for the               
composite system—we are carving up reality into smaller bits than it really contains. On this               
reading, entanglement doesn’t consist in a unique form of ontological dependence, but rather             
the ontological holism of entangled composites (Healey 2016). This brings us close to the              
motivation for wavefunction realism discussed above, but there remain two crucial differences:            
(a) the wholes in question are located in 3-dimensional space, and (b) all and only systems of                 
mutually entangled particles are wholes. Thus, only if everything is truly entangled would this              
result in monism, and even then, entanglement—in the form of ontological holism—would be a              
genuine feature of our world. 
 
Bell (1997) claimed that non-local correlations “cry out for explanation.” By saying what’s special              
about entangled physical systems, the present account goes further in answering this demand.             
15 
Of course, if one adopts an interpretation which features a universal wavefunction with             
widespread entanglement, then we may be drawn to a version of monism on this view as well.                 
However, there still may be a level of description at which it’s appropriate to deploy effective                
wavefunctions which will be more restrictive in ascribing non-separable quantum states. If so,             
this approach may be deployed at that level: (all and only) the effectively entangled particles               
ontologically depend on the wholes they compose. This sort of non-global and effective             
application of the common ground explanation is unavailable on wavefunction realism, which is             
a global claim about fundamental reality. 
 
The non-global common ground explanation of non-locality sketched here is incomplete in            
several respects. Most significantly, substantial work is required to fully integrate it into the              
extant interpretations of quantum theory. That said, it is prima facie open to any interpretation               
that posits systems of particles in non-separable quantum states to regard particles in such              
systems as ontologically dependent on the wholes they compose. The details of how such              
entangled states come about and are dissolved can be treated as a separate matter. 
 
Thus, providing a common ground explanation of non-locality doesn’t require wavefunction           
realism. One can instead retain entanglement as a genuine feature of our world by recognizing               
part-on-whole dependence. This alternative does a better job of explaining what’s special about             
systems that display non-local behavior. 
 
4. Implications for spacetime fundamentality 
 
Our primary aim in the foregoing discussion has been to recommend entanglement realism over              
views that we see as eliminative. The discussion also has some important implications for the               
role of spacetime in our thinking about quantum theory. 
 
A common feature of both of the approaches criticized above---Super-Humeanism and           
wavefunction realism---is the fundamental place they give to spatialtemporal (or          
quasi-spatialtemporal) relations. First, consider the Super-Humean. Esfeld and Deckert         
maintain that the only features of matter points are their spatiotemporal relations. This elevates              
background spacetime to an almost analytic status; the view cannot be articulated in a world in                
which fundamental spacetime or spacetime relations cannot be defined. Second, consider           
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wavefunction realism. On this view, ordinary 3-dimensional space has been replaced by a             
fundamental 3​n​-dimensional configuration space. But, the analogous “quasi-spatial” relations         
between points in configuration space are given fundamental status. Thus, both views eschew             
putative entanglement relations in favor of an ontology of only (quasi-)spatiotemporal relations.            
However, this simplified ontology has certain costs. We’ve already discussed the potential            
explanatory cost in eliminating entanglement, but there is another important cost as well: the              
commitment to only (quasi-)spatiotemporal relations leaves hostages to fortune. 
 
In the case of wavefunction realism, it is an open question whether the approach can be                
extended beyond ordinary non-relativistic quantum mechanics (Wallace and Timpson 2010;          
although see Ney forthcoming for a response). In the case of Super-Humeanism, the need to               
adopt something like a “primitive ontology” interpretation of quantum mechanics both leaves            
hostages to relativistic fortune and offends against the naturalistic metaphysical spirit by            
allowing background metaphysical preconceptions to dictate the choice of an idiosyncratic           
approach to a physical theory. 
  
Moreover, if spacetime is emergent as some approaches to quantum gravity seem to suggest              
(Huggett and Wüthrich 2013), then clearly approaches that seek to eliminate relations of             
entanglement in favor of fundamental (quasi-)spatiotemporal relations will be untenable. This           
again recommends a common sense realism about entanglement relations over eliminativism. 
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